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Abstract

The crises of wage theft and industrial accidents in low-wage America reflect erosion of the social contract but
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organizations with government inspectors to patrol workers’ industries and labour markets for unfair
competition. It extends to the federal level previous work in which Jennifer Gordon and i have documented
dynamic contemporary examples of tripartism at the state and local levels. The article explores historical
precedents for tripartist collaboration on the federal level at the Department of Labor (DOL) in the Wage and
Hour Division and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. It then considers several tripartist
initiatives at the DOL under the Obama administration, the legal obstacles that purportedly stand in the way
of more robust approaches, and some potential solutions. The article concludes with an explanation of why
formalizing partnerships matters.
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Solving the Problem from Hell:
Tripartism as a Strategy for Addressing
Labour Standards Non-Compliance in
the United States
Janice Fine *
The crises of wage theft and industrial accidents in low-wage America reflect erosion of the
social contract but they also reflect a crisis in labour standards enforcement. This article
draws upon archival material, case studies, and interviews to make the case for tripartism—
an enforcement regime that partners workers’ organizations with government inspectors to
patrol workers’ industries and labour markets for unfair competition. It extends to the federal
level previous work in which Jennifer Gordon and I have documented dynamic contemporary
examples of tripartism at the state and local levels. The article explores historical precedents
for tripartist collaboration on the federal level at the Department of Labor (DOL) in the Wage
and Hour Division and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. It then considers
several tripartist initiatives at the DOL under the Obama administration, the legal obstacles
that purportedly stand in the way of more robust approaches, and some potential solutions.
The article concludes with an explanation of why formalizing partnerships matters.
La crise du vol des salaires et des accidents industriels chez les travailleurs à faible revenu
des États-Unis témoigne de l’érosion du contrat social, mais également de la crise qui
sévit dans le domaine de l’application des normes du travail. Cet article se fonde sur des
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archives, des études de cas et des entrevues pour expliquer le bien-fondé du tripartisme,
régime d’application des lois qui réunit organisations de travailleurs et inspecteurs
du gouvernement pour patrouiller le secteur et le marché du travail où œuvrent les
travailleurs afin d’y déceler toute concurrence déloyale. Ce régime étend au palier fédéral
des travaux antérieurs dans lesquels Jennifer Gordon et moi même avons documenté des
exemples contemporains dynamiques de tripartisme au niveau local et à celui de l’État.
Cet article se penche sur les précédents historiques en matière de collaboration tripartite
au palier fédéral, à la Wage and Hour Division et l’Occupational Safety and Health
Administration du Département du Travail des États-Unis. Il examine ensuite plusieurs
mesures tripartistes du Département du Travail sous l’administration Obama, les obstacles
juridiques qui empêchent supposément une approche plus énergique, ainsi que certaines
solutions potentielles. L’article se conclut par une explication des raisons pour lesquelles il
importe d’officialiser ces partenariats.
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In a development that gives new meaning to the phrase “adding insult to

injury,” many low-wage workers in the United States today—who already
struggle to get by on salaries that are barely enough for basic subsistence—cannot
even count on safe workplaces or on their employers properly reporting the hours
they have worked and paying the wages they are owed. A recent study found
that 26 per cent of low-wage workers1 in the nation’s three largest cities suffered
minimum wage violations in the week prior to its survey, and over 76 per cent of
1.

Low-wage workers are defined as all workers earning less than the hourly wage that would
lift a family of four above the poverty threshold, which was 11.06 American dollars or less
an hour in 2011, given full-time, full-year work. See Lawrence Mishel et al, eds, The State
of Working America, 12th ed, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press for the Economic Policy
Institute, 2012) at 307, 433.
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low-wage workers who laboured more than forty hours in the prior week were not
paid according to overtime laws.2 In some regions, the US Department of Labor
(DOL) itself has recorded compliance levels with the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 19383 (FLSA) below 50 per cent in industries such as nursing homes, poultry
processing, daycare, and restaurants.4
While the crises of wage theft and industrial accidents in low-wage America
are indications of erosion of the social contract, they are also indicative of a crisis
in labour standards enforcement. There are four mismatches at the heart of this
crisis. First, government policies and strategies have not kept pace with secular
shifts in industrial structures and employment relations. Second, government
funding has not kept pace with the dramatic increase in the number of firms
covered under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19705 (OSH Act) and
the FLSA. Third, there has been a mismatch between government immigration
policy and private sector labour demand. Finally, as Jennifer Gordon and I argue,
traditional “logics” of enforcement6—how government detects violators and deters
employers from violating wage and hour laws—have broken down. What is
needed is strategic or directed enforcement—focussing on the sectors with the
biggest problems—something US President Barack Obama’s DOL has strongly
embraced. But while strategic enforcement represents an important paradigm
shift, it will not succeed unless it is accompanied by significant enhancement of
worker voice. Simply put, problems will remain hidden unless workers speak up
but most workers will not speak up in isolation.
Asymmetries of power between low-wage workers, especially immigrants,
and the firms for which they work keep individual workers from stepping forward much of the time. Collective representation through labour unions,
particularly for vulnerable workers, has traditionally provided a safer means for
asserting rights at work and improving conditions through collective bargaining.
But with the decline of unions, few private sector workers have the benefit of
collective representation. In this context, the individual rights regime has gained
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

Annette Bernhardt et al, Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor
Laws in America’s Cities (Report of the University of Illinois at Chicago Center for Urban
Economic Development, the National Employment Law Project, and the UCLA Institute for
Research on Labor and Employment, 2009) at 2, online: <http://www.unprotectedworkers.org>.
29 USC § 201.
US, Department of Labor, 1999-2000 Report on Initiatives (Employment Standards
Administration, Wage and Hour Division, 2001) at 7-9 [DOL, Report on Initiatives].
29 USC § 651 [OSH Act].
“Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement through Partnerships with Workers’
Organizations” (2010) 38:4 Pol & Soc’y 552.
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importance. Worker centres (community-based, worker-organizing groups that
have emerged largely since the 1990s) spend much of their efforts assisting
workers in learning wage and hour and occupational health and safety laws and
insisting upon their enforcement. This article makes the case for tripartism,
an enforcement regime that partners workers’ organizations with government
inspectors to patrol their industries and labour markets for unfair competition.
In previous work, Gordon and I7 have documented dynamic contemporary
examples of tripartism at the state and local levels. This article extends that
earlier work by elaborating on tripartism on the ground at the federal level.
After reviewing the regulatory mismatches identified in Part I and discussing the
potential role for tripartism in labour standards enforcement in Part II, Part
III explores historical precedents for tripartist collaboration in the Wage and
Hour Division (WHD) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) of the DOL. Part IV then considers tripartist initiatives at the DOL
under the Obama administration. Part V surveys the legal obstacles that some
say stand in the way of more robust approaches and poses some potential
solutions. Part VI grapples with the question of how and in what ways
formalizing partnerships matters. The article draws upon case studies, interviews,
and informal conversations conducted with organizers, experienced labour
inspectors, supervisors, high-level government officials, and attorneys familiar
with labour and employment law, as well as archival material from government,
unions, and worker centres to make the case for tripartism.

I. Four Mismatches at the Heart of the
Enforcement Crisis
A. Government Policies and Investigatory Strategies Mismatch
Industry Structures

Labour standards enforcement is still catching up to the growth of post-Fordist
network production systems in which organizations focus on their core
competencies and fulfill their remaining needs through dynamic relationships
with other service providers.8 In low-wage industries, the vertical disaggregation
of firms due to the rise of network supply chains has led to an explosion of what
7.
8.

Ibid.
See Damian Grimshaw et al, “Introduction: Fragmenting Work Across Organizational
Boundaries” in Mick Marchington et al, eds, Fragmenting Work: Blurring Organizational
Boundaries and Disordering Hierarchies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 1.
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David Weil has labelled the “fissuring” of the employment relationship.9
Fissuring occurs when companies shift the direct employment of workers to other
business entities through increased reliance on strategies such as subcontracting,
use of temporary employees, and independent contracting arrangements.10 Often
firms are embedded in subcontracting networks in which one large firm or a few
firms are setting the terms of exchange but are not the employers of record for
purposes of enforcement. Most of the industries at greatest risk of FLSA and
OSH Act violations are predominantly composed of establishments with fewer
than twenty employees;11 small businesses are less likely to have sophisticated
record-keeping systems and human resources departments and to participate
in regulatory communities that keep them abreast of the law. Smallness also
poses great logistical challenges: If the same number of workers is employed
across many small enterprises instead of one or a few large enterprises, more
investigative personnel will be required to inspect them.
B. Government Funding for Investigators Mismatches the
Growth in the Number of Workers and Establishments
Covered Under the FLSA

When the FLSA was enacted in 1938, it covered only one-third of American
workers, predominantly in manufacturing, and excluded those in service,
retail, domestic, and agricultural sectors. In the decades that followed, the FLSA
was gradually expanded to include a broader swath of industries and occupations.
Many small businesses were also brought under the FLSA by lowering the
threshold volume of annual sales that determined whether a firm had to comply
with it. The past thirty years have seen a 55 per cent increase in the estimated
number of workers covered and a 112 per cent increase in the number of
9.

Improving Workplace Conditions Through Strategic Enforcement: A Report to the Wage and
Hour Division (Boston: Boston University, 2010) at 18-26, online: US Department of Labor
<http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf>.
10. Ibid.
11. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, “Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the
Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace” (2005) 27:1 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 59. Weil
and Pyles use data on actual hours worked and wages received that are reported by workers
in the Current Population Survey (a monthly household survey conducted by the US Census
Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics) to generate a list of the 33 industries at highest
risk of wage and overtime violations. Gordon and I refine their findings by analyzing the
composition of establishments in those high-risk industries and find that most of the industries
Weil and Pyles identify at greatest risk of FLSA violations are overwhelmingly composed of
establishments with fewer than twenty employees. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 6.
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establishments covered under the FLSA.12 Although the number of WHD
inspectors doubled from about 650 in 1960 to a high-water mark of 1,343 in
1978,13 by 1982 the inspectorate was down to 929.14 In 2008, WHD had only
709 investigative staff.15 Even when WHD reached its highest staffing level,
the economy was expanding much more rapidly, increasing the number of
firms covered under the law. In the largest increase in many years, the Obama
administration’s 2012 congressional budget request proposed to field an
inspectorate of 1,032 staff to monitor app- roximately 7.3 million firms.16 The
2012 budget was approved, and the 2013 request proposes a rise to 1,112 staff
to monitor approximately the same number of firms.17 Numbers are harder
to find for OSHA. According to the agency, a combined state and federal
workforce of approximately 2,200 inspectors is responsible for the health and
safety of 130 million workers at over 8 million worksites.18 This translates to
about 1 compliance officer for every 59,000 workers.19
C. Government Immigration Policy Mismatches Private Sector
Labour Demand

Between 1990 and 2000, more immigrants arrived in the United States than
during any previous period in American history.20 The immigrant population
grew by more than 1 million people per year, rising from 19.8 million to 31.1
12. Brennan Center for Justice, Economic Policy Brief no 3, “Trends in Wage and Hour
Enforcement by the U.S. Department of Labor, 1975-2004” by Annette Bernhardt &
Siobhán McGrath (New York: New York University School of Law, 2005).
13. Willis J Nordlund, The Quest for a Living Wage: The History of the Federal Minimum Wage
Program (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1997) at 119, 186.
14. Ibid at 186, 194-97.
15. Official communication from the US Department of Labor in response to the author’s
request under the Freedom of Information Act [copy on file with author] (indicating that the
total number of federal inspectors in 2008 was 709). See 5 USC § 552.
16. US, Department of Labor, FY 2012 Congressional Budget Justification: Wage and Hour
Division at 14, 19, online: <http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2012/PDF/CBJ-2012-V2-03.
pdf> [DOL, FY 2012].
17. US, Department of Labor, FY 2013 Congressional Budget Justification: Wage and Hour
Division at 19, online: <http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2013/PDF/CBJ-2013-V2-09.pdf>
[DOL, FY 2013].
18. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, “How Many Inspectors Does OSHA Have?”
OSHA Frequently Asked Questions, online: <http://www.osha.gov/OSHA_FAQs.html>.
19. Ibid.
20. US, Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, Series P23-206, Profile of the Foreign-Born
Population in the United States: 2000 by Dianne Schmidley (Washington: US Government
Printing Office, 2001) at 8-9.
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million.21 The largest percentage of new arrivals came from Mexico and Central
America.22 By 2009, foreign-born workers accounted for 15.7 per cent of the
civilian labour force and included 8 million undocumented immigrants who
contributed over 5 per cent of the labour force.23
While employers have manifested a ferocious hunger for low-wage immigrant
workers, national immigration policy has made it exceptionally hard for
many unskilled workers to immigrate legally or to regularize their status. The
liberalization of admissions policies in 1965 ended discriminatory country quotas
but for the first time placed limits on migration from the western hemisphere.
The temporary worker program with Mexico (the Bracero Program24) also ended
in the same period. Later policy changes placed a quota on Mexican immigrants
of 20,000 per year, abolished the right of minor children to sponsor parents’
immigration, and repealed the Texas Proviso that had exempted employers from
prosecution for hiring undocumented workers. Structural adjustment policies
and the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in
1994 had a devastating impact on Mexican agriculture and certain domestic
manufacturing sectors, leading to increased levels of migration even as avenues
for legal admission to and legalization once in the United States were increasingly
restricted.25 Although employment-based admission essentially excludes unskilled
workers, Mexican workers, along with smaller but significant numbers of
workers from Central America, continued to migrate to the United States for

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid at 10.
23. Rakesh Kochhar, C Soledad Espinoza & Rebecca Hinze-Pifer, After the Great Recession:
Foreign Born Gain Jobs; Native Born Lose Jobs (Washington: Pew Hispanic Center, 2010) at 3.
24. The Bracero Program ended in 1964. At the start of the Second World War, southwestern
growers and other business interests, joined by their legislative champions, complained to
executive branch officials that war-induced labour shortages necessitated a new Mexican
temporary worker program. In response, in 1942 the State Department negotiated a special
agreement with Mexico establishing the Bracero Program that Congress quickly approved.
Mexican braceros routinely received much lower wages than native US workers and endured
substandard living and working conditions. Nevertheless, the Bracero Program endured
for almost two decades after the war ended. Guarded by a “cozy triangle” of agribusinesses,
southern and western congressional “committee barons,” and a lax immigration bureaucracy,
roughly 4.2 million Mexican workers were imported under the Bracero Program. For more
on this program, see Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and
the I.N.S. (New York: Routledge, 1992).
25. See Douglas S Massey, “The New Immigration and Ethnicity in the United States” (1995)
21:3 Population & Dev Rev 631; Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Gendered Transitions: Mexican
Experiences of Immigration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) at 19-33.

820

(2013) 50 osgoode Hall Law Journal

work at least until 2007.26 America’s immigration policy simultaneously made
it harder for unskilled workers to immigrate legally, while casting a blind eye on
employer hiring and management practices.27 Increased border and workplace
enforcement under both the Bush and Obama administrations may have
reduced the numbers of undocumented workers coming into the United States
but also certainly made them more fearful of coming forward to complain of
mistreatment. Numerous studies have documented the high rates of workplace
injuries and fatalities among foreign-born Latinos.28
D. Government “Logics”29 of Enforcement Mismatch the
Realities of Low-Wage Work30

The primary logic of enforcement that emerged in the early years of the FLSA
was a complaint-driven approach to detecting violations, premised on the
assumption that workers would come forward and inspections would be triggered
by their complaints. However, workers in precarious employment positions
at small contractors are less likely to come forward and less likely to be visited
by inspectors.
Addressing worker complaints is clearly an important part of the mandate
of a workplace enforcement agency. The question is whether it should be the
predominant aspect of the government’s labour standards enforcement approach.
An affirmative answer would be appropriate if the industries logging the most
complaints were also those with the worst underlying conditions. However,
26. See Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, New Migration from Mexico Falls
to Zero—and Perhaps Less (Washington: Pew Hispanic Center, 2012). The authors report
that migrant numbers from Mexico have decreased since 2007. Explanations for this decline
range from the efficacy of government enforcement, such as increased deportations and
heightened border control, to social and economic factors like lower birthrates and greater
opportunities in Mexico combined with the lasting downturn in the United States.
27. See Muzaffar Chishti, “Employer Sanctions Against Immigrant Workers” (2000) 3:6
WorkingUSA 71.
28. For a summary of basic trends, see Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release,
USDL-12-1888, “Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries Summary, 2011” (20 September
2012), online: <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.nr0.htm>; Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Economic News Release, USDL-12-2204, “Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses
Requiring Days Away From Work, 2011” (8 November 2012), online: <http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/osh2.nr0.htm>.
29. See Patricia H Thornton & William Ocasio, “Institutional Logics” in Rovston Greenwood et
al, eds, The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (London, UK: Sage, 2008) 99.
30. The discussion on “logics” of enforcement in Part I(D) is drawn from my previously
published work. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 6 at 555-58.
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research by David Weil and Amanda Pyles finds little overlap between industries
with the highest FLSA complaint rates and those with the highest wage and
overtime non-compliance rates, suggesting that workers in industries with the
worst conditions are much less likely to complain.31 When the vast majority of
resources are taken up by complaints, as they have been, there are not enough
resources available to address some of the most problematic sectors.
For a time, at least in high-wage industrial states, the number of federal
inspectors was augmented by inspectors from state labour departments with
sizeable inspectorates. In the second logic of enforcement, states had a large
inspectorate that divided up the enforcement turf geographically and patrolled
it systematically on the theory that firms would comply, in part, because they
would anticipate inspection. Resource constraints have, however, taken this
approach off the table. Today, state wage and hour divisions are much smaller
and take an overwhelmingly complaint-based approach to enforcement.32
Over the past quarter-century, the workplace has been a site for experimentation with various forms of “new regulatory” practice.33 This is reflected in a trend
towards industry self-regulation in the arenas of health and safety standards, wage
enforcement, and discrimination, among others. The idea that employers should
monitor themselves is the third logic of enforcement.
Scholars of self-regulation have recognized its limitations for small employers
and low-wage workers. In the low-wage settings where wage and hour and
safety and health issues abound, it is probable that without a strongly enforced
public regime of penalties for non-compliance, self-regulation would contribute
to the further deterioration of standards in low-wage sectors.34
31. Supra note 11 at 4.
32. See e.g. Irene Lurie, “Enforcement of State Minimum Wage and Overtime Laws: Resources,
Procedures, and Outcomes” (2011) 15:2 Employee Rts & Employment Pol’y J 411; Jacob
Meyer & Robert Greenleaf, Enforcement of State Wage and Hour Laws: A Survey of State
Regulators (New York: National State Attorneys General Program at Columbia Law School,
2011), online: <http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/ag/policy/Labor/wagehour>.
33. “New regulatory” scholars have critiqued the command-and-control model of regulation
as ill-suited to addressing complex societal problems. In its place, they propose more
decentralized, flexible, and collaborative approaches that usually involve both public and
private actors. See e.g. Michael C Dorf & Charles F Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism” (1998) 98:2 Colum L Rev 267; Jody Freeman, “Collaborative Governance
in the Administrative State” (1997) 45:1 UCLA L Rev 1 at 31; Jody Freeman, “The Private
Role in Public Governance” (2000) 75:3 NYUL Rev 543; Susan Sturm, “Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach” (2001) 101:3 Colum L Rev 458;
Cynthia Estlund, “Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation” (2005)
105:2 Colum L Rev 319.
34. See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation
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Finally, since the 1940s, WHD has intermittently complemented its
reliance on complaints with a focus on proactive inspections, the fourth logic
of enforcement. In the case of low-wage industries, there is a strong case
for federal and state departments of labour to use data on non-compliance
levels to target specific industries in particular geographic areas. Although
WHD strongly embraced a proactive investigation strategy alongside the
complaints-based approach during the 1940s and 1950s, by 1960 the agency
had begun an enduring reorientation towards the now predominant complaintsbased approach.35 While the fourth logic has never taken root at the DOL as
the predominant institutional model, WHD under the Obama administration
has shown an extremely strong interest in making it a major focus.36
While the first logic of complaint-driven inspection will always be a part
of any government enforcement strategy, it has been insufficient to address the
problem of non-compliance in low-wage sectors. In an era of declining resources
for state governments, the second logic of comprehensive coverage seems no
longer a realistic possibility, and the third logic of self-regulation has limited
use in the context of the lowest-wage work. Thanks to groundbreaking research
conducted over many years by Weil37 and strong leadership at the DOL, the
fourth logic of strategic or directed enforcement is enjoying a renaissance. To
improve compliance, it has targeted for intensive inspection specific high-risk
industries that rely heavily on subcontracting, independent contracting, and
temporary workers. High-risk sectors include residential construction, eating
and drinking establishments (especially fast food), hotels and motels, janitorial
services, landscaping and horticultural services, retail, health care and home
health care services, domestic work, and agriculture.38 In 2011, WHD pledged
to “use its directed investigations to increase WHD presence in high risk
industries, i.e., those industries with high minimum wage and overtime violations
and among vulnerable worker populations where complaints are not common.”39

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 106; Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning
the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2010); Orly Lobel, “Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of
Workplace Safety” (2005) 57:4 Admin L Rev 1071.
For a comprehensive decade-by-decade analysis of WHD’s inspection strategies, see
Nordlund, supra note 13 at 59-119.
See US, Department of Labor, FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification: Wage and Hour
Division, online: <http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2011/PDF/CBJ-2011-V2-03.pdf >; DOL,
FY 2012, supra note 16; DOL, FY 2013, supra note 17.
Supra note 9.
Ibid at 2.
DOL, FY 2012, supra note 16 at 19.
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WHD’s strategic enforcement strategy entails pursuing approaches focussed at
the top of industry structures, targeting business entities rather than individual
workplaces, holding joint employers liable for violations, and expanding the use
of the “hot goods” provision of the FLSA.40
For WHD investigators to succeed in their strategic enforcement efforts,
however, they must be connected to institutions of worker voice. Investigators
must join forces with civil society actors who complement limited staffing
resources, are intimately acquainted with the complex structures and strategies
of companies in labour-intensive industries, and most importantly, have
relationships with workers and engage them in reflection, education, leadership
development, and action.
While starting at the top of industry structures makes sense in terms of
holding the most powerful players responsible for non-compliance, most of
the time the problems are manifested through workers at the bottom of supply
chains—they must be the eyes, ears, mouths, and ultimately, legs of strategic
enforcement. But worker voice is not a solo performance; most employees
will not play this role independent of trusted organizations. Additionally, my
previous analyses of worker centres’ unpaid wage and occupational health and
safety claims make clear that not all affected workers are employed by companies
linked to larger actors at the top of industry supply chains.41 Top-down strategies
are therefore not suited to these subsectors.

II. Tripartism as a Strategy for Addressing
Labour Standards Non-Compliance in the
United States
Government must always play a central role in enforcing minimum workplace
standards, but even if inspectors were more strategically deployed, there
will simply never be enough of them to adequately cover labour markets. A
new system of tripartism or co-produced enforcement42 that draws on the
40. Ibid at 19, 26-27.
41. Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press for the Economic Policy Institute, 2006) at 72-99.
42. This very important idea comes from Matthew Amengual to describe enforcement when
there are high levels of administrative capacity and strong linkages on the part of both
government and civil society groups. See Matthew Amengual, “Complementary Labor
Regulation: The Uncoordinated Combination of State and Private Regulators in the
Dominican Republic” (2010) 38:3 World Dev 405; Matthew Amengual, Enforcement
Without Autonomy: The Politics of Labor and Environmental Regulation in Argentina (PhD
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complementary strengths of government and civil society organizations should
be established.
Along with an emphasis on strategic enforcement, this proposal for integrating
worker voice into enforcement is rooted in two seminal concepts. The first is
Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite’s concept of tripartism, in which, along with
the government regulator and the firm, a public interest group (such as a union
or some other community-based worker organization) is given a formal role
in the regulatory process.43 The second is Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers’
theory of associative democracy,44 which calls for government to draw on
“the distinctive capacity of associations to gather local information, monitor
behaviour and promote cooperation among private actors”45 by assigning
enforcement duties as well as other roles to third-party groups.
In a previous article, Gordon and I elaborated four requirements for
tripartism.46 First, partnerships must be formalized—the parties must openly
negotiate their expectations of and commitments to each other, including
the distribution of resources. This is important to render the partnerships
less vulnerable to changes in agency leadership or political regime. Second,
partnerships must be sustained so that relationships between the staff of the
agency and the organizations have time to build, increasing the resilience of
their bond in the face of future conflict. Lessons learned from each joint effort
can also enrich the next stages of the collaboration. Third, partnerships must be
vigorous—the role of the third-party partners is not symbolic, marginal, or merely
consultative, but is instead fully integrated into the work of the agency. Finally,
the partnerships must also be adequately resourced—government must allocate
enough staff to be able to mount a credible effort and must provide a threshold

43.
44.
45.
46.

Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011) [unpublished]. For more on the larger
concept of institutionalized co-production in service provision, see John Alford, “A Public
Management Road Less Traveled: Clients as Co-producers of Public Services” (1998) 57:4
Aust J Pub Admin 128; Taco Brandsen & Victor Pestoff, “Co-production, the Third Sector
and the Delivery of Public Services” (2006) 8:4 Pub Mgmt Rev 493; Anuradha Joshi &
Mick Moore, “Institutionalised Co-production: Unorthodox Public Service Delivery in
Challenging Environments” (2004) 40:4 J Dev Stud 31; Elinor Ostrom, “Crossing the Great
Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development” (1992) 24:6 World Dev 1073; Tony
Bovaird, “Beyond Engagement and Participation: User and Community Coproduction of
Public Services” (2007) 67:5 Pub Admin Rev 846.
See supra note 34.
“Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance” (1992) 20:4 Pol & Soc’y 393.
Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, “Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance” in
Joshua Cohen et al, eds, Associations and Democracy (New York: Verso, 1995) 45 at 45.
Supra note 6 at 561.

Fine, solving the problem from hell 825

level of financial support to partner organizations that need it to fully participate.
Government should also provide mechanisms for gaining access to accurate,
complete, and timely information.
In conversations with investigators and department leaders, there was a
strikingly limited understanding of the variety of means through which worker
centres and unions could augment the work of government inspectors. Most
saw worker organizations as a means through which to disseminate information
to workers but not as a means through which to gather it. For this reason, it
is worthwhile to explore in some detail four main mechanisms through which
worker organizations can enhance enforcement: detection of non-compliance,
outreach to workers in targeted sectors, collection of evidence to facilitate
enforcement actions, and convening strategic partnerships. The following is a
composite collection of dozens of real-life examples of these mechanisms culled
from interviews with worker-centre and union leaders and government officials.
First, worker organizations can improve detection of non-compliance by:
(a) providing inspectors with specialized knowledge of industry structures,
including their range of subcontracting arrangements and employment practices;
(b) providing inspectors in targeted industries with tips on employers who are
not complying with wage and hour and occupational health and safety laws;
(c) teaching inspectors and being a resource about specific ethnic communities
by relating information on language interpretation, settlement history, key
cultural practices, community institutions, neighborhoods, and leaders; (d)
working through worker networks to identify workers employed in targeted
firms and industries of interest to inspectors; and (e) functioning as an
early-warning system in terms of problem industries and employers.
Second, worker organizations can use worker outreach to enhance
enforcement by: (a) providing informational visits, training, dissemination, and
one-on-one consultation in multiple languages to workers in low-compliance
sectors; (b) offering office hours at centres and local unions where workers who
might be intimidated by going to a government office can come to discuss
their situations; and (c) providing safe space, interpretation, and facilitation for
inspectors to meet with workers.
Third, worker organizations can collect evidence to facilitate enforcement
by: (a) gathering information about firm practices, encouraging workers to file
complaints with state and federal agencies, and providing technical assistance to
them in doing so; (b) assembling the information necessary to bring cases by
gathering from workers testimony and documentation about hours worked,
deductions taken, and safety conditions; (c) building cases through systematic
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reconstruction when workers lack pay stubs by identifying and interviewing
each worker, determining which contractor employed them, and establishing
the dates and hours worked; (d) identifying the full scope of the subcontractor’s
operations; (e) expanding cases beyond initial complainants by identifying others
who have been impacted; (f) going to worksites, homes, and other locations to
speak with workers during times when they are working but inspectors often
are not (on nights and weekends); and (g) providing a means for workers to file
concerns anonymously.
Finally, worker organizations can convene strategic partnerships to enhance
enforcement by organizing industry taskforces within specific geographic labour
markets that bring together key state and federal government agencies with
community and labour organizations.
There are real-life examples of tripartism. Gordon and I documented state
and county cases, including the Los Angeles Unified School District and Board of
Public Works’ joint deputization of union business agents to inspect prevailingwage job sites47 and the partnership between the California Labor Commissioner’s
Janitorial Enforcement Team and the Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund to
raise compliance levels in the building-services sector. A third example, Wage
and Hour Watch (WHW) in New York, which took a “neighborhood watch”
approach to improving wage and hour compliance in specific geographic areas of
New York, no longer exists.48 In contrast to these state and county cases explored
in our previous research, the focus in this article is on the federal level.
The federal government plays a central role in wage and hour and
occupational health and safety enforcement. The DOL under President Obama
has added investigators and embraced new strategies but has been reluctant to
explore more formalized and systematic partnerships. Yet, as I explore in Part
III, there are important precedents for tripartism at the federal level under both
Democratic and Republican administrations.

47. Prevailing wage laws at the federal and state levels mandate minimum wages based upon the
median wage for specific occupations working on public or publicly funded projects in the
local labour market.
48. For more on all three examples, see Fine & Gordon, supra note 6 at 563-71.
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III. Two Historical Examples of Collaborations at
the US DOL
A. OSHA Susan Harwood Training Grants

The Susan Harwood Training Grant Program, a competitive discretionary
grant program established by OSHA in 1978, is an interesting case of a longrunning program that explicitly supports civil society organizations. For over
thirty years, OSHA has provided approximately 10 to 11 million American dollars
per year in direct funding to faith-based organizations, worker centres, unions,
employer associations, and state and local government-assisted institutions
of higher education to provide training and education to employers and workers
“on the recognition, avoidance, and prevention of safety and health hazards in
their workplaces and to inform workers of their rights and employers of their
responsibilities under the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act.”49 There
are three categories of grant: “capacity building,” which is intended to help
organizations develop or expand their capacity to offer training; “target topic,”
which provides support to organizations to offer training on a particular
OSHA priority subject; and “training materials,” which supports organizational
development of written curricula.50
While the Harwood grants only support training, not enforcement activities,
the fact that they support civil society actors to partner with government in the
service of strengthening safety and health in American workplaces—and do so
on an ongoing, formal, and resourced basis—makes them a compelling example
49. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Susan Harwood Training Grant Program –
Program Overview, online: <http://www.osha.gov/dte/sharwood/overview.html>.
50. Examples from among the many 2010 and 2011 awardees include El Comité de Apoyo a los
Trabajadores Agricolas, District 1199C Training and Upgrading Fund, Casa Latina, Clergy
and Laity United for Economic Justice, Make the Road NY, Rutgers University, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, Farmworker Justice, LIUNA Training and Education Fund, American
Federation of Teachers Educational Foundation, United Auto Workers, Service Employee
International Union Education and Support Fund, Casa de Maryland, Inc (Central
American Solidarity Association), Compacion Foundation Inc, Hispanic Contractors
Association de Tejas, National Day Laborer Organizing Network, and Interfaith Worker
Justice. See Occupational Safety & Health Administration, OHSA Susan Harwood Training
Grant Program – 2010 Susan Harwood Grant Awardees, online: <http://www.osha.gov/dte/
sharwood/2010_grant_recipients.html>; Occupational Safety & Health Administration,
OHSA Susan Harwood Training Grant Program – FY 2011 Susan Harwood Grant Awardees,
online: <http://www.osha.gov/dte/sharwood/2011_grant_recipients.html>.
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of tripartism. Perhaps because it was enacted during a period of concerted
consumer and labour advocacy and organizing between 1969 and 1974,51 the
OSH Act embodied a more proactive vision of safety and health administration,
undertaken in partnership with civil society actors. This is reflected in the statutory
language itself. For example, section 21 of the original Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 197052 enabled civil society actors to play a role by mandating
that OSHA engage in the provision of training and employee education either
directly or through grants or contracts.53 Also, formal collaborative programs
exist in “state plan” states where OSHA delegates its authority to enforce health
and safety standards to state governments that propose standards and strategies
“at least as effective” as OSHA’s.54 Several of these states require certain types of
businesses to develop health and safety committees at each worksite.55
B. Memoranda of Understanding at WHD

In 1999, hoping to leverage limited enforcement resources, WHD under the
Bush administration began signing partnership agreements with sister federal
agencies, state governments, employer groups, worker associations, and
foreign consulates. Between 1999 and 2007, the Bush DOL signed 78
partnership agreements with federal agencies, a diverse set of state departments
of labour (including Florida, Texas, New York, Colorado, and Pennsylvania),
employer associations (such as the Texas Produce Association, Korean Apparel
Manufacturers Association, Labor Ready, Tennessee Foresters Association, and
the American Mushroom Institute), and foreign consulates based in northeastern, midwestern, and southern cities.56 Agreements were also signed with
community organizations, including the Los Angeles coalition Employment
Education and Outreach (EMPLEO), the Las Vegas Interfaith Council for Worker
Justice Worker Rights Centre, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, and
Justice and Equality in the Workplace in Orlando, Florida and Houston, Texas.
51. See Kitty Calavita, “The Demise of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration:
A Case Study in Symbolic Action” (1983) 30:4 Soc Prob 437; David Vogel, “The Power of
Business in America: A Re-appraisal” (1983) 13:1 Brit J Pol Sci 19; William T Gormley Jr,
“Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System” (1986) 18:4 Polity 595.
52. 29 USC § 670.
53. Ibid.
54. OSH Act, supra note 5, § 667(c)(2).
55. Ibid, §§ 667(c)(4), 667(c)(6). See also Occupational Safety & Health Administration, State
Occupational Safety and Health Plans, online: <http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/index.html>.
56. The full list of organizations is on file with the author.
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Sixty-seven of the partnerships were still in place as of March 2008 when the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report evaluating them.57
The most common partnership activity was education (94 per cent),
including WHD attendance at seminars and training sessions and the distribution
of pamphlets and other materials to workers and employers. In addition to
education, a majority of agreements encouraged partner groups to refer complaints
to WHD. A much smaller number entailed monitoring agreements, which
provided guidelines for employers to monitor themselves or their contractors
for potential FLSA violations and to report these to WHD.58
In the view of one long-time high-level administrator, who was at WHD
throughout the Bush administration, it is important to parse the different types
of partnership agreements that were being signed during this period. She recalled
that many agreements were signed with national employer associations under
which the associations would mail out information to all of their members about
the child labour or wage and hour laws and WHD would make presentations
to their annual conventions.59 In her view, these types of efforts were “largely
fluff.”60 But other partnership agreements, such as those put in place in Houston
and Dallas among WHD, the Mexican Consulate, and a local worker centre were
much more substantial because each partner committed to carrying out specific
activities such as staffing a worker hotline.61
In Houston, the partnership agreement was signed with Justice and
Equality in the Workplace, a coalition that included WHD; OSHA; the US
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs; the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education
Fund; the Mayor’s Office of Immigrant and Refugee Affairs; the Catholic
Archdiocese; the Harris County chapter of the American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations; the Hispanic Contractors Association;
and the Mexican, Colombian, Salvadoran, Guatemalan and Honduran
consulates. The parties agreed to a set of activities that included: holding
educational programs on workplace rights targeted to the Latino community in
Houston; distributing educational program materials; participating in activities
57. US, Government Accountability Office, Testimony before the Committee on Education
and Labor, House of Representatives, GAO-08-962T, Fair Labor Standards Act: Better Use of
Available Resources and Consistent Reporting Could Improve Compliance (Washington: GAO,
2008) (Anne-Marie Lasowski).
58. Ibid at 12-13.
59. Interview of Rae Glass (24 February 2009) [copy on file with author].
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
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such as press events, community educational training, seminars, conferences, and
consulate training; providing financial support for the initiative; strengthening
agreements among government agencies, consulates, and community groups in
order to promote workers’ rights and responsibilities; publicizing the campaign
through the media; designating a contact person; conducting meetings to evaluate
the campaign; and completing annual evaluations of the “statistical success”62
of the initiative.63 A partnership with a similar set of players and activities was
signed in 2004 in Los Angeles.
According to the GAO report, “Partnerships and outreach represent a small
proportion of WHD’s compliance activities, constituting about 19 percent of
all WHD staff time from 2000 to 2007.”64 The percentage of staff time devoted
to outreach events decreased from 22 per cent in 2000 to 13 per cent in 2007.65
Between 2003 and 2007, outreach mostly targeted employers, although during
this period more diverse groups were also targeted for outreach, including
“schools, government agencies and community-based organizations.”66 After
reading through the agreements and interviewing agency leaders, the GAO
found the large majority of these agreements to have entailed outreach as
opposed to actual joint enforcement activities. In fact, joint enforcement
activities were mentioned in only a small proportion of the agreements, and it is
unclear how many of these were actually implemented. The GAO report therefore
concluded that “time spent on partnerships was almost completely accounted for
in outreach event time … .”67 While it cannot be claimed that these agreements
are complete examples of the tripartism advocated in this article, the Obama
administration could build upon them to develop something stronger that
extends beyond outreach and education to enforcement.
The Secretary of Labor was one of the last cabinet positions to be nominated
and confirmed after the election of President Obama in 2008, but several of the
leaders named to top posts hail from states with extensive experience with partnerships between unions, worker centres, and government investigators. Other
appointees are veteran labour lawyers, administrators, and organizers. From the
time of their nominations, many of these officials and the DOL in general have
62. This language comes from the partnership agreement and means that the parties would try
to quantify their interventions by tracking how many trainings they conducted, how many
“know your rights” brochures were distributed, et cetera.
63. Partnership agreement on file with the author.
64. Supra note 57 at 11 [citations omitted].
65. Ibid at 12.
66. Ibid at 12-13.
67. Ibid at 11, n 22.
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been the targets of an assault on the part of the right that has seen interest groups
and members of Congress join forces to attempt to block agency appointments
and publicly criticize initiatives. For this reason, there was no permanent WHD
Administrator for the entire first term of the Obama presidency. This brutal
climate has made it difficult for the DOL to function at all, let alone to undertake
new initiatives.

IV. Tripartism and the Obama Department of Labor
In 2010, the Obama administration moved to appoint two of the architects
of New York Wage and Hour Watch (WHW), Patricia Smith and Lorelei
Boylan, to the posts of Solicitor General and WHD Administrator, respectively.
Republicans in Congress attempted to block both appointments and although
Smith was eventually confirmed, it was only after a bruising process in which the
nominees’ involvement in WHW was a major focus. During the appointment
hearings, the right-wing advocacy group Americans for Limited Government
claimed, “This initiative could very likely be a model used by Smith and
Boyland [sic] on a national level … . [I]t could turn tens of thousands of
‘community organizers’ into raving vigilantes nationwide.”68 During Smith’s
confirmation hearings, Senator Mike Enzi claimed WHW gave “community-activist
groups like ACORN [Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now] vigilante power and credentials authorizing their targeting of small
nonunion businesses.”69
To what, exactly, were Enzi and Americans for Limited Government
objecting? In the summer of 2009, the New York State DOL and six
organizations signed a memorandum of agreement committing the groups
to identify and train some of their leaders to serve as “Wage and Hour Watch
Members” for two years. In their “Wage and Hour Watch Zone,” these leaders
would provide at least fifty businesses per quarter with labour law compliance
brochures and hold informational sessions about labour laws for the public.
WHW groups were also charged with referring potential labour law violations
to the DOL. Members would not, however, carry out inspections. The DOL
68. Americans for Limited Government, “Who Are M Patricia Smith and Lorelei Boylan?”
NomineeAlert (May 2009) at 1, online: Americans for Limited Government <http://www.
getliberty.org/Files/NomineeAlert%20-%20M_%20Patricia%20Smith%20and%20
Lorelei%20Boylan%20-%20DOL%20%2005_14_09.pdf>.
69. Jake Blumgart, “The Long Fight for Labor” The American Prospect (9 March 2010), online:
<http://prospect.org/article/long-fight-labor-0www.prospect.org>.
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committed to designate a WHW contact within the Division of Labor Standards
to administer the program, take complaints, communicate with organizations
regarding the status of investigations “to the extent allowable by law,” provide
a page on the DOL’s website describing project participants and their areas of
work, and participate in quarterly telephone calls with the groups.70 The New
York State DOL had weathered deep budget cuts as a result of the fiscal crisis
and so was unable to provide any funding to participating groups. Smith was
eventually confirmed but, after nine months in limbo, Boylan withdrew her
candidacy and returned to New York.
Despite the deeply polarized atmosphere in Washington, WHD continued
to sharpen its strategies for protecting vulnerable workers by strengthening
compliance in targeted industries. It added over 250 new field investigators
and strongly embraced strategic enforcement. In fact, according to WHD, the
percentage of directed investigations (as opposed to responding to complaints)
increased from 22 per cent in the first quarter of fiscal year 2011 to 35.7 per cent
in the fourth quarter—a ratio almost unprecedented in the seventy-four-year
history of the FLSA.71
There are worker organizations focussing on almost all of WHD’s targeted
industries, and many of them have met with WHD to discuss their concerns.
Under the Obama administration, the DOL has held several listening sessions
with the Excluded Workers Congress, a coalition of national networks of worker
centres including the National Day Labourer Organizing Network, the National
Domestic Workers Alliance, Restaurant Opportunities Center United, and other
workers’ rights organizations that have been working to have previously excluded
categories of workers protected under the FLSA.
Since 2010, WHD has repeatedly stated in its strategic plans and budget
justifications its intention to work with worker advocacy groups and other
community organizations. In fact, the 2012 Congressional Budget Justification
submitted to Congress stated:
WHD will leverage its partnership arrangements with other federal, state and local
agencies, and with worker and community-based organizations to satisfy the
following criteria: the partnership must represent the collective benefit of the
workforce, be a means for disseminating information on rights and/or obligations,
and mitigate the fear of retaliation among workers who seek assistance in remedying
violations. Stakeholder coordination will provide avenues for information gathering

70. Memorandum of understanding and other draft documents provided by Terri Gerstein, New
York State Department of Labor [copies on file with author].
71. DOL, FY 2013, supra note 17 at 22.
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on compliance issues and will provide opportunities to develop meaningful
compliance assistance tools.72

WHD officials say they want to engender these policies in the day-to-day
practices of career investigators, striving to move beyond political appointees
in the Washington office.73 In 2011, WHD began the process of hiring
Community Outreach and Resource Specialists (CORPS) in twenty-three
regional offices. These are full-time outreach positions intended to institutionalize
working with community organizations in the field. Most of the hiring was
internal, although some positions were posted for outside applicants. WHD’s
stated goal is for these outreach workers to work with worker centres, unions, and
community organizations on campaigns related to WHD’s targeted industries,
both before and after investigations.74
Although it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of these new positions,
there was some early tension about how CORPS was conceptualized. Concerned
that CORPS would be quickly overwhelmed if viewed as general liaisons, initially
WHD decided not to make the contact information of CORPS investigators
public, saying that it wanted them to focus on targeted industries rather than
serving in a more overarching outreach capacity. Instead, WHD leaders said
that investigators would reach out to specific organizations on an as-needed
basis when seeking to cooperate on individual strategic campaigns. There was
some feeling in the advocacy community that limiting contact at the outset
was not a good idea because fruitful collaborations were more likely to grow if
investigators were consistently accessible to organizations and because working
with organizations on an ongoing basis would be the best way to foster
relationships of trust and reciprocity.75
A draft MOU between WHD and the Workers Defense Project (WDP) in
Austin, Texas76 would seem to be a model of tripartism. The collaboration targets
two problem industries with systemic wage and hour violations (at present,
72. DOL, FY 2012, supra note 16 at 19-20.
73. Interviews of WHD officials [fall and early winter 2009].
74. DOL officials say, due to confidentiality issues, they cannot work with organizations
during investigations.
75. See Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1966) at
30-50; Daniel T Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism” (1982) 10:4 Rev Am Hist 113.
76. [Copy on file with author]. The draft MOU was never finalized but was kept in place and
was operational. Interviews of Cristina Tzintzun, Executive Director, Workers Defense
Project (October 2011 and May 2013). The reason for this state of affairs is unclear.
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construction and restaurants). It involves WDP members and volunteers
conducting surveys to find violations and reporting these to WHD for
investigation. It also involves WHD officials coming regularly to meet with
workers at the WDP office, attending monthly worker meetings, accepting
complaints directly from the WDP (in cases where workers are not comfortable),
going out to specific construction sites and restaurants when the WDP
identifies problems through its worksite surveys, and providing regular status
updates on cases.
While WHD under Obama has been mounting strategic enforcement
initiatives in targeted industries and asserting the importance of collaborations
in its congressional budget requests, there has been reluctance to formalize
partnerships and engage in activities along the lines suggested above. In fact,
during the Obama administration’s first term, the DOL decided to stop initiating
the memoranda of understanding with organizations begun under the Bush
administration. The Austin MOU, rather than being the first of a new and
improved breed of partnership agreements, appears to be the only one of its
kind. Likewise, beginning in 2009, OSHA dropped the word “partnership”
from its press materials regarding the Susan Harwood grants.77 What is behind
these changes?
77. Throughout the George W Bush years, annual press releases announcing grantees described
the program this way:
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, employers are responsible for
providing a safe and healthful workplace for their employees. OSHA’s role is to assure the
safety and health of America’s working men and women by setting and enforcing standards;
providing training, outreach, and education; establishing partnerships; and encouraging
continual process improvement in workplace safety and health. For more information,
visit www.osha.gov.

See e.g. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Trade News Release, “OSHA
Seeking Nominations for National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and
Health” (30 January 2008), online: <https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_
document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=1493http://www.osha.gov>. Since 2009,
under the Obama Administration, they now read: “Under the OSH Act, OSHA’s role is to
promote safe and healthful working conditions for America’s men and women by setting and
enforcing standards, and providing training, outreach and education. For more information,
visit http://www.osha.gov.” See e.g. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Region
7 News Release, 09-1295-KAN, “US Labor Department’s OSHA Cites Crane and Grain
Service LLC of York, Neb., for Violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act” (27
October 2009), online: <https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_
table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=1665http://www.osha.gov>.
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V. Tripartism Killers? The Federal Advisory
Committee and Anti-Deficiency Acts
Key players at the DOL have repeatedly cited concerns that partnerships like the
ones in New York and California that were briefly described above in Part IV may
violate the Federal Advisory Committee Act78 (FACA) as well as the Anti-Deficiency
Act79 (ADA).
Enacted as part of a set of “openness in government” reforms in 1972 (which
also included the Government in the Sunshine Act,80 the Freedom of Information
Act,81 and the Administrative Procedures Act82), the FACA’s goal was to limit the
unbalanced influence on public policy of special interests acting through advisory
committees while, at the same time, providing government with low-cost and
relatively unbiased expert advice.83 Specifically, the FACA is supposed to keep
Congress and the public informed about the number, purpose, membership,
and activities of the federal government.84 The FACA was explicitly intended to
stop the proliferation of such committees and has been used to eliminate them
by setting per agency ceilings on the number of committees that could be
established. Agencies that reach their limit would have to eliminate some
committees in order to be able to create new ones.85
An onerous process is required in order to establish and administer an advisory
committee. First, an advisory committee cannot meet or become active until a
charter has been filed with the head of the agency establishing the committee and
approval has been obtained from the General Services Administration (GSA), the
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

5 USC § 1 [FACA].
31 USC § 1341.
5 USC § 552b.
Supra note 15.
5 USC § 551.
See US, Bureau of Land Management, National Policy for the Federal Advisory Committee
Act, What BLM Staff Need to Know When Working with ADR-Based Collaborative Community
Working Groups (Washington: BLM Alternative Dispute Resolution and Conflict
Prevention Program, 2005), online: <http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wo/
Communications_Directorate/general_publications/faca.Par.76214.File.dat/ADR-FACA_
Guide_textonly.pdfhttp://www.blm.gov>; Henry H Perritt Jr & James A Wilkinson, “Open
Advisory Committees and the Political Process: The Federal Advisory Committee Act After
Two Years” (1975) 63:3 Geo LJ 725.
84. See Richard O Levine, “The Federal Advisory Committee Act” (1973) 10:2 Harv J on Legis
217; Jerry W Markham, “The Federal Advisory Committee Act” (1974) 35:3 U Pitt L Rev 557.
85. See Steven P Croley & William F Funk, “The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good
Government” (1997) 14:2 Yale J on Reg 451.
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Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the standing committees of the
Senate and House with jurisdiction over the relevant agency. Second, Congress is
required to ensure that each advisory group has a “fairly balanced membership,”86
which is to be determined by OMB and GSA (and each member must be vetted
for conflicts of interest). Third, each group must conduct open public meetings;
interested persons are entitled to attend, appear before, or file statements with
any advisory committee and to have an opportunity to provide public comment.
(Advisory committees may close meetings to the public if the President or the
head of the agency determines that one of the exceptions to the Government in
the Sunshine Act applies.) Fourth, each group must announce meetings fifteen to
thirty days in advance in the Federal Register and must prepare detailed minutes
that are made available to the public. Fifth, each group must be provided with
“adequate”87 staff, quarters, and funds. Finally, unless the enabling statutes
provide otherwise, each group must terminate at the end of two years.88
It has been argued, particularly by environmental observers, that the “internal
paradox” of the FACA is that its rigid procedural requirements have ended
up chilling public participation rather than encouraging it. Rebecca J. Long
and Thomas C. Beierle find that organizations that would be constructive
participants in environmental decision making end up being too daunted by
the FACA to press for inclusion.89 On the government side, these scholars
observe that ambiguities about the FACA’s requirements and fear of litigation
have resulted in “FACA-phobia” with agencies dreading engagement with
organizations and fearing “any type of public involvement with entities not
chartered under the FACA.”90 Government officials opt not to have contact
with outside organizations in ad hoc meetings because they are not certain of
whether the FACA would apply. In a 1994 study of the forestry sector, for
example, respondents identified the FACA as the most significant barrier to
ecosystem management.91
86. 5 USC App 2, § 5(b)(2).
87. FACA, supra note 78, § 568(c).
88. See Rebecca J Long & Thomas C Beierle, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Public
Participation in Environmental Policy, Discussion Paper 99-17 (Washington: Resources for
the Future, 1999), online: <http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-99-17.pdf> at 4.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid at 3, 9.
91. See Daniel B Schlager & Wayne A Freimund, “Legal and Institutional Obstacles to
Implementing Ecosystem Management” in H Ken Cordell, ed, Integrating Social Science and
Ecosystem Management: A National Challenge (Proceedings of the Conference on Integrating
Social Sciences and Ecosystem Management, Helen, Ga, 12-14 December 1995) 57, cited in
Long & Beierle, supra note 88 at 9, n 24.
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In the case of tripartism, which is envisioned to strengthen compliance with
the FLSA, it would certainly seem that the FACA’s requirements of balance,92
advance notice for meetings, and detailed minutes to be made public would
almost certainly stymie strategic collaboration in real time.
The Anti-Deficiency Act was passed in 1982 but has been around in some form
since 1884.93 It was enacted by Congress to ensure that the federal government
would not spend money it did not have permission to spend. As a consequence
of the law, agencies must plan their expenditures to avoid making obligations
in excess of their appropriations. When agency budgets are tight, the ADA may
require an agency to curtail or suspend certain discretionary programs or activities.
Specifically, the ADA prohibits federal employees from: making or authorizing
an expenditure from, or creating or authorizing an obligation under, any
appropriation or fund in excess of the amount available in the appropriation or
fund unless authorized by law; involving the government in any obligation to pay
money before funds have been appropriated for that purpose, unless otherwise
allowed by law; accepting voluntary services for the United States, or employing
personal services not authorized by law, except in cases of emergency; and making
obligations or expenditures in excess of an apportionment or reapportionment,
or in excess of agency regulations.94
Are the FACA and the ADA really barriers to tripartism at the US DOL?
Preliminary opinions solicited by the author from the GAO95 as well as
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW)96 suggest that
the FACA would not be triggered by the tripartism described in Part IV, above.
From CREW’s perspective, while the FACA applies to committees established
92. See Croley & Funk, supra note 85 at 500 [citations omitted]. In exploring the “balance”
requirement of the FACA, § 5(b), Croley and Funk find that there is some ambiguity in
terms of what is required of Congress versus the federal agencies themselves in ensuring
balance. They explain:
[B]ecause section 5 specifies not agencies’, but rather Congress’s, responsibilities under the
Act, and furthermore because 5(c) conditions its applicability with the language “to the extent
possible”—without specifying who shall determine the extent to which observance of 5(b) is
possible—it is not clear how much 5(b) actually constrains agencies.

93.
94.
95.
96.

On the other hand, the General Service Administration’s regulations do require agencies to
seek a balanced membership.
See Maj Gary L Hopkins & Lt Col Robert M Nutt, “The Anti-Deficiency Act (Revised
Statutes 3679): and Funding Federal Contracts: An Analysis” (1978) 80 Mil L Rev 51.
Supra note 79, §§ 1341(a)(1)(A), 1341(a)(1)(B), 1342, 1517(a).
Private correspondence with the GAO (10 January 2012) [copy on file with author].
Private correspondence with CREW (1 January 2012) [copy on file with author].
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to give advice and recommendations, the training, information sharing, and
cooperation on enforcement activities that tripartism envisions do not fall under
this category. Critically for our purposes, the FACA also appears not to apply
when the government asks for the assistance of third parties to enforce the law
rather than for advice.97
When asked to provide an opinion, attorneys at the GAO said that the
DOL is not expressly prohibited from engaging in these partnerships; rather, the
department’s financial situation may have become so limited that it could not
spend additional resources on making these partnerships without exceeding
its budgetary limitations.98 This is where the ADA comes into play. CREW’s
response was that while it is true that the ADA prohibits the government’s
acceptance of voluntary services, a distinction has been recognized between
voluntary and gratuitous services, with gratuitous services being permitted.99
Both the GAO and CREW took the position that the vision of tripartism
advanced here would not trigger either the FACA or ADA, but if DOL leaders
continue to believe that these statutes do apply, there are simple strategies that
could be adopted to clear the way. First, in terms of the FACA, it seems that the
question of who sets the table is definitive: If worker centres or unions were to
convene the taskforces and organize the meetings that bring together investigators
with civil society organizations, WHD would be able to send representatives
to participate in those initiatives without triggering the FACA. In terms of the
ADA, under a Comptroller General opinion, voluntary services are defined as
“those which are not rendered pursuant to a prior contract, or under advance
agreement that they will be gratuitous.”100 Federal agencies have been permitted
to accept from private entities gratuitous services rendered under a cooperative
agreement specifying that the services would be free of cost to the government.101
97. See General Services Administration, 41 CFR Parts 101-6 and 102-3, “Federal Advisory
Committee Management: Final Rule” (2001) 66:139 Federal Register 37728 at 37734,
§§ 101-3.25. See also ibid at 37735, §§ 101-3.40(k) (listing as an example of a group not
covered by the FACA, “Any committee established to perform primarily operational as
opposed to advisory functions. Operational functions are those specifically authorized by
statute … such as making or implementing Government decisions or policy”).
98. Supra note 95.
99. Supra note 96.
100. US, Comptroller General, Decision in the Matter of: “Army’s authority to accept services
from the American Association of Retired Persons/National Retired Teachers Association,”
File no B-204326 (26 July 1982).
101. US, Office of Management and Budget, CIRCULAR A-110 REVISED 11/19/93 As
Further Amended 9/30/99, online: The White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
circulars_a110>.
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In other words, if worker centres and unions took this approach—clearly spelling
out that there was no expectation of payment now or in the future—they would
avoid the prohibition in the ADA.
The bottom line is that even if the US DOL embraces the most conservative
interpretations of the FACA and the ADA, it could still participate in an effort
convened by a worker centre or union without triggering the FACA, and as
long as it makes clear there is no expectation of funding, without triggering the
ADA. Of course, the question remains how worker centres in particular will fund
the work it would take to set these tables and to oversee and participate in the
ongoing collaboration. Government funding is justified, and precedents exist for
the DOL providing financial support to community partners (such as the Susan
Harwood Training Grants Program); ideally these efforts should be funded in
order to maximize their impact.
In analyzing cases of institutional co-production in the provision of public
services through regular, long-term relationships between state agencies and
organized groups of citizens, Anuradha Joshi and Mick Moore argue that as long
as resources are available, co-production need not involve contractual or quasicontractual arrangements and that the actual relationship might be undefined,
informal, and renegotiated almost continually.102 The limitations of voluntary
unfunded programs can be identified as a primary reason why it was relatively
easy for New York’s Wage and Hour Watch to be discontinued. Some of the
participating organizations said that because the program was never resourced it
was difficult for them to devote the time to it.103 Organizations that had other
avenues to the DOL decided to rely on those rather than devoting time to a
program that had not been built up and whose main agency proponents were on
the way out.
If organizations view the work as a priority, some may be able to provide
or find the funds for their participation. In both the Maintenance Cooperation
Trust Fund and Los Angeles Unified School District and Board of Public Works
cases, discussed above in Part II, unions and unionized employers financially
support the work either through providing contributions or staff because it is in
their direct self-interest to police their labour markets and penalize bad actors. In
the case of worker centres that generally rely on foundation funding for the bulk
102. Supra note 42.
103. There was agreement among all parties that it was not resourced and government officials
never claimed otherwise. Personal communication with Terri Gerstein and Deborah Axt
from Make the Road and Jeff Eichler from Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union
(RWDSU) [spring 2011].
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of their support, there would have to be clear prioritization and communication
with funders about why this work is so instrumental to alleviate poverty and
empower low-wage workers. Ideally, WHD would establish a program similar to
the Harwood grants to support tripartism in enforcement efforts on the ground.
While legality is arguably not a barrier to participation, one barrier could well be
political viability during a period of extreme partisanship.

VI. Does Formality Matter?
Tripartism as envisioned by Ayres and Braithwaite104 provides a specific public
interest organization with a formal and ongoing role in enforcement. Ayres and
Braithwaite propose that relevant organizations be made fully fledged partners
in enforcement, which involves providing them clearly delineated and publicly
recognized responsibilities; access to the information the regulator has about
non-compliance; the same standing as the regulator to sue or prosecute under
the regulatory statute; and a seat at the table along with investigators and firms in
negotiations regarding improvements, fines, and penalties.105 This is the maximal
program, but it flies in the face of some strong inherited traditions. The Weberian
ethos of rational-legal authority106 has deep resonance in the United States and
it, along with the Progressive Era ideal of the independent civil bureaucracy,107
is deeply encoded in the culture of government administration. These norms
likely underlie reflexive negative reactions to the idea of explicit and formalized
investigatory partnerships.
Given that the implementation of even a limited version of tripartism
will be a fight and that it may expose the Obama Labor Department to even
more criticism, is formality important enough to struggle for? As a general rule,
organizations are more likely to adopt a policy or program (especially if it is
controversial) if the measure is institutionalized through law, but it can also
come about through the gradual diffusion of best practices.108 Perhaps if agency
104. Supra note 34.
105. Ibid at 56-60.
106. See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed by Guenther Roth
& Claus Wittich, translated by Ephraim Fischoff et al (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968).
107. See Otis A Pease, “Urban Reformers in the Progressive Era: A Reassessment” (1971) 62:2 Pac
NW Q 49.
108. Scholars distinguish between early adopters of innovations in formal structures and later
adopters, finding that early adopters do so out of a desire to improve internal processes whereas
later adopters do so because, once historical continuity has established the efficacy of the
change, they feel they must do so in order to retain societal legitimacy. See Pamela S Tolbert &
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personnel and organizations have ongoing relationships and these organizations
have the power and resources to push WHD regional administrators, formal
partnership may not be as important. In fact, because of what the government
might feel it must leave out, formal partnerships may turn out to be weaker than
informal ones on the ground with strong groups. Finally, in a polarized political
environment, informal arrangements are more likely to allow for getting things
done by “flying under the radar.”
But there are strong arguments in favour of formalization as well. Weaker
organizations that lack the resources and power to establish strong informal
relationships with government agencies may need the formal partnership in
order to compel their recognition and inclusion in enforcement collaborations.
Additionally, effective informal cooperation is reliant upon relationships between
individuals at a specific political moment and, thus, it is always contingent
and temporary. The temporal nature of individual relationships lowers the
probability that organizations will be able to establish permanent structural
changes regarding how enforcement is done, at least potentially leading to
a culture of compliance among low-wage employers in their labour markets.
Finally, concern on the part of government officials that close collaboration with
civil society organizations could lead to charges of cronyism or favouritism is
perhaps the most important argument for formalization of the collaborative
relationship with a clear set of rules and procedures.
But while formalization is necessary, it is not sufficient when the depth of the
collaboration is weak. WHW was formalized, but it never really took off. When
Patricia Smith and Lorelei Boylan were nominated for federal positions and
WHW became a target of attack for Republicans in the Senate, the New York
State DOL paused the program so as not to undermine the nominees’ chances
at confirmation. The program was never resumed. Formalization alone was not
enough. Organizations said that they did not fight for the program because
its limitations meant it was not worth the work they would have to invest to
revive it.109
Although one might reasonably assert as a general rule that formalizing
and specifying the role of organizations in the labour standards enforcement
process would be preferable to informality, it is clear that efforts to formalize
participation can backfire when they are too rigid. Ultimately, however, this is
a question of getting the institutional design and ongoing interpretation right
Lynne G Zucker, “Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of Organizations:
The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform, 1880-1935” (1983) 28:1 Admin Sci Q 22.
109. Interview of organizational leaders from Make the Road and the RWDSU [spring 2011].
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rather than being a problem of formality itself. It is also about politics: In the
deeply polarized environment that prevails in Washington today, even with
evidence of the efficacy of the enforcement strategy coupled with clearly defined
roles and objectives, objections are more likely to be motivated by partisan
political considerations than by policy disagreements.

VII. Conclusion
While it would be a great step forward if tripartism were to be legislated or if
a powerful executive were to mandate it, self-interest is probably the most potent
force for persuading government investigators on the ground to engage in
partnerships. In California and New York, support for partnerships seems to
have grown when investigators had positive concrete experiences with individual
organizations that helped them put together stronger cases, when they served
under agency leaders who were pursuing reform agendas, or when they
themselves came out of a civil society background. Even in cases where
investigators were positively inclined, effective working partnerships required
patience, goodwill, and results.
In his study of labour standards enforcement in Argentina, Matthew
Amengual concludes that in states with weak and politicized inspectorates,
bureaucrats generate resources for enforcement through their relationships with
civil society organizations.110 These state-society linkages include routinized
processes of consultation, formal and informal agreements, and interpersonal
networks that facilitate direct interaction between labour inspectors and civil
society organizations promoting enforcement. In fact, Amengual finds that strong
relationships between labour inspectors and civil society organizations committed
to enforcement helped bureaucrats overcome resistance by organized interests
seeking to block enforcement.111 In the United States, a strong state with weak
enforcement capacity, the case can be made that these relationships will make a
critical difference.
Given the divergent perspectives and organizational cultures of government
investigators, worker centres, and unions, it is critical to invest in a process of
relationship building. Parties must get to know each other, openly discuss and
negotiate expectations, and identify goals and mechanisms for collaboration.
Clear agreement must be reached about how cases coming from worker centres
110. “Pathways to Enforcement: Labor Inspectors Leveraging Linkages with Society in Argentina,”
Indus & Lab Rel Rev [forthcoming].
111. Ibid.
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or unions will be handled, including how priority will be assigned and by what
methods organizations will be kept up to date about investigations. Liaisons
should be designated who are in regular contact and are actively engaged in
sharing information and reporting on progress with cases. The parties need to
meet regularly and investigators should hold meetings on-site at worker centres
and union offices. There must be accountability and timely follow-up on both
sides. Fundamentally, all parties must be clear about their roles and be willing
to accept a dynamic tension in the relationship: Civic actors will push for as
much information and aggressive action as they can get, and their activism will
help galvanize investigators to do more; in contrast, government actors will be
more cautious, more focussed on getting the employer’s perspective, and more
motivated to keep some of the details of their investigations confidential. This
will be a constructive tension.
There is a lot at stake. Occupational projections by the US Bureau of
Labor Statistics112 predict that by 2016, half of all jobs will require only modest
on-the-job training and little if any post-secondary education. Studies by the US
DOL and academic researchers have found that these jobs, in sectors including
retail, food preparation, home healthcare, building, and grounds cleaning and
maintenance are rife with wage theft.113 Election to a second term of office puts
President Obama in a position to take greater risks in the service of fundamental
change. Articulating and putting into practice a vision of tripartism that marries
the DOL’s focus on strategic enforcement with the power of civil society
institutions may be what it will take to make firms in low-wage labour markets
compliant with wage, overtime, and health and safety standards.

112. See “Projections Overview” Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2012-13 Edition (29 March
2012), online: <http://www.bls.gov/ooh/about/projections-overview.htm>.
113. See e.g. Bernhardt et al, supra note 2; DOL, Report on Initiatives, supra note 4 at 7-9.

